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Abstract
The proper method of constitutional interpretation has been debated throughout the history of the
Supreme Court. This debate has been defined by the tension between the originalist and living
constitution jurisprudences. Each has been dominant at one point in United States history. A fair
construction jurisprudence was almost universally utilized by the Supreme Court to interpret the
Constitution according to its original meaning until Plessy v. Ferguson. Then, due to an alliance
between evangelicals and progressive scholars, a broader, more lenient living constitution
jurisprudence developed which allowed justices to interpret the Constitution in light of changing
social norms. Finally, following perceived excesses of the living constitution jurisprudence
culminating in Roe v. Wade, evangelicals once again adopted a new jurisprudential philosophy to
adhere to originalism which soon after grew in public acceptance. It is likely that the future of
American jurisprudence lies in the hands of evangelicals who guide the dominant jurisprudence
used by Supreme Court Justices.
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Fair Construction to Living Constitution: Analyzing Constitutional Interpretation
Throughout United States History
Introduction
Debate has been a cultural foundation of the United States. It has occurred not only in the
public and political spheres but also in the legal sphere. The interpretive method used to decipher
the paramount legal text, the Constitution, is important and has been hotly debated. Multiple
philosophies have been developed for how to interpret the document including fair construction,
original intent, aspirationalism, and living constitutionalism. However, most, if not all, of these
philosophies can be boiled down to two categories: originalism and living constitutionalism.
Each category has been dominant at some point in the history of the American court
system. From the Founding to the Civil War, a form of originalism in which the text was
consulted and interpreted according to its original meaning was almost universally adopted.
However, following the controversial Dred Scott v. Sandford and Plessy v. Ferguson decisions
and the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the public
increasingly demanded societal changes regarding morality. When the legislative process was
deemed ineffective at providing these changes, legal scholars developed new interpretive
strategies that permitted the courts to allow the definitions of words in a legal document to
change over time, and courts were given the ability to interpret the words according to these
changes. As they developed, these strategies dominated the legal world and eventually became
the jurisprudence of living constitutionalism. Justice Holmes was influential in gaining
widespread acceptance for living constitutionalism. Though there was always latent resistance to
living constitutionalism, this resistance exploded after a series of controversial cases. Cases such
as Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade were problematic to large swaths of the public,
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especially evangelicals, because they seemed to have no justification in the text of the
Constitution and promoted public immorality. As a result, originalism once again gained
prominence in both the legal world and general society. Justice Antonin Scalia was the most
prominent of the new originalists and championed the originalist technique of textualism. Today
originalism and living constitutionalism are battling in the public and legal arena for dominance.
Background
Jurisprudence is the philosophy of law. Within this branch of philosophy, contentious
debate exists about what law is, the role of law, and how laws should be interpreted. In modern
America, the most debated question in jurisprudence is how the Constitution should be
interpreted. Are the words of the Constitution set in stone the moment it is passed, or can its
meaning change over time to adapt to new societal norms and desires?
Originalists contend that the original meaning of the Constitution should be used in its
interpretation.1 The original meaning is the meaning the writers of the document intended and
the one their contemporaries understood.2 Proponents claim originalism provides stability and
objectivity when interpreting the Constitution.3 Within originalism, there has been continuous
debate about how exactly to determine the original meaning of a text. In the early republic, most
Justices utilized fair construction. In this strategy, the words of the text were examined according
to their clear meaning. If there was ambiguity, all potential meanings of the text were scrutinized
with reliance on the purpose and context of the text. When all but one interpretation was found to
1

John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2013), 1.
2
Ethan Greenberg, Dred Scott and the Dangers of a Political Court (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2009), 252.
3

Herman Belz, A Living Constitution Or Fundamental Law?: American Constitutionalism in Historical
Perspective (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 185.
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be lacking, the Justice ruled according to this fair construction.4 Since the modern rejuvenation
of originalism, Saul Cornell has contended there have been three phases. The first phase focused
on the intent of a text, the second phase focused on the public meaning of a text, and the third
phase focused on the legal meaning of a text.5 Another modern form of originalism, textualism,
holds that one should rule based on “the original meaning of the text.”6 Justice Scalia
popularized this form, and it is prevalent among modern Originalists.
Critics of originalism contend it is self-defeating and subjective. Judges frequently give
in to the temptation to allow social pressure to influence decisions and, consequently, rulings are
unjustified. Paul Finkelman has contended, “what we are really witnessing in these cases [cases
decided by Originalists] is a deeply conservative ‘living Constitution’ jurisprudence,
masquerading (rather poorly) as an original intent jurisprudence.”7 Another common criticism is
that originalists are unable to provide due diligence to the history of a legal text required to
understand it. Saul Cornell has concluded, “Until originalist scholars develop a genuinely
historical approach to understanding the way the Constitution was read in the Founding Era, they
will continue to distort the past, not illuminate it.”8 Originalists retort that it is better to attempt
for an objective standard by which all judicial decisions can be weighed than promote a
subjective standard where the will of the judge rules.

4

Charles F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1996), 138.
5

Saul Cornell, "Reading the Constitution, 1787–91: History, Originalism, and Constitutional
Meaning," Law and History Review 37, no. 3 (2019): 823.
6

Belz, Living Consittution or Fundamental Law 249.

7
Paul Finkelman, "The Living Constitution and the Second Amendment: Poor History, False Originalism,
and a very Confused Court," Cardozo Law Review 37, no. 2 (2015): 626.
8

Cornell, “Reading the Constitution,” 845.
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In contrast, living constitutionalists argue that the Constitution incorporates intentionally
vague language to allow future generations to legitimately interpret the text differently than the
Framers. Living constitutionalists generally believe, “courts should, in a proper case, interpret
the Constitution in new ways to meet changing times.”9 Societies and words change over time,
and the Constitution should be allowed to adjust to these changes. Thurgood Marshall declared,
“I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever ‘fixed’ at the Philadelphia
Convention.”10 A common example of living constitutionalism is aspirationalism. This
philosophy argues that judges should use their rulings to assist the public in aspiring to do
good.11 By allowing the Constitution to adapt with the times, it can remain relevant and
productive in the modern day.
Critics of living constitutionalism argue that it is subjective and liable to changing on a
judge’s whim. Justice Scalia observed, “there is no agreement, and no chance of agreement, upon
what is to be the guiding principle of the evolution.”12 If the purpose of the Constitution was to
adapt to the times, it is difficult to discern how and when those changes occur. What percentage
of the population needs to believe homosexuality is a constitutionally protected liberty before a
Justice is vindicated in modifying his rulings in response? Former Chief Justice William
Rehnquist echoed Scalia’s concerns when he argued, “Beyond the Constitution and the laws in
our society, there simply is no basis other than the individual conscience of the citizen that may

9

Greenberg, Dred Scott, 254.

10

Thurgood Marshall, "The Constitution: A Living Document," Howard Law Journal 30, no. 4 (1987):

11

Greenberg, Dred Scott, 254

915.

12

Antonin Scalia and Amy Gutmann, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law: An Essay
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 45.
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serve as a platform for the launching of moral judgments.”13 There is no justification to believe
the morality of judges is superior to the morality of the public, so judges should not allow
personal morality to control judicial decisions. Robert Bork noted, “The truth is that the judge
who looks outside the historic Constitution always looks inside himself and nowhere else.”14
Nothing prevents the morality of nine judges from overruling the morality of the voting populace
in living constitutionalism if the two groups conflict.
Studying the different eras of the Supreme Court provides a useful opportunity to
understand the ongoing debate between originalists and living constitutionalists. A better
understanding of the relationship between originalism and living constitutionalism in the present
can be discerned by analyzing how and why different jurisprudences developed and proliferated.
The Jay Court
Established in 1789, the Jay Court was given the unenviable task of establishing the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court without any Supreme Court precedent. While the Judiciary
Act of 1789 provided the structure and roles of the various federal courts (such as the number of
justices on the Supreme Court and where the District Courts were located), it did not provide a
jurisprudential framework for judicial decision making.15 Because of this constraint, some have
concluded the Jay Court established little Supreme Court judicial philosophy. Herbert Johnson
has argued, “Jay’s contributions must be evaluated in terms of their institutional, rather than their
jurisprudential, worth.”16 Though the Jay Court contributed most substantially to the
13

William H. Rehnquist, “The Notion of a Living Constitution,” Texas Law Review 54, no. 4 (1976), 704.

14
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Free Press,
1990), 242.
15

Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).

16

Herbert A. Johnson, "John Jay and the Supreme Court," New York History 81, no. 1 (2000): 59.
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development of the Supreme Court as a legitimate institution in the United States, it also
provided a useful framework to examine Founding Era jurisprudence.
Because the Jay Court did not have Supreme Court precedent, it relied on the common
law for guidance. The common law was, “The body of law derived from judicial decisions,
rather than from statutes or constitutions.”17 This common law was fundamental to the British
legal system, and, when the colonists arrived in America, they brought the common law tradition
of England with them.18 This tradition existed through the revolutionary era. Norman F. Cantor
has noted, “when the Constitutional Convention met in a steamy summer in Philadelphia in
1787, it was with the assumption that English common law would continue unchanged in the
United States.”19 The Founding Fathers largely consisted of lawyers trained in the common
law.20 Bernadette Meyler has concluded the common law could, “provide a set of background
principles crucial to understanding the general terms of the Constitution, a text certainly of small
compass if wide scope.”21
However, though the common law was an important tool of the early republic’s legal
system, it was insufficient for making Supreme Court decisions. Meyler has noted, “writings
from the founding era and materials from the states in the period following ratification

17

Bryan A. Garner and Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, 11th ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson
Reuters, 2019), s.v. “common law.”
18

Clarence Manion, "The Founding Fathers and the Natural Law: A Study of the Source of our Legal
Institutions," American Bar Association Journal 35, no. 6 (1949): 462.
19
Norman F. Cantor, Imagining the Law: Common Law and the Foundations of the American
Legal System (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), 354.
20

Manion, “The Founding Fathers and the Natural Law,” 461.

21

Bernadette Meyler, "Towards a Common Law Originalism," Stanford Law Review 59, no. 3 (2006): 575.
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demonstrate that the common law occupied a disunified field in the late eighteenth century.”22
As a result, many Founding Fathers, including James Madison, believed the common law could
not entirely dictate the meaning of many of the Constitution’s clauses.23 It was up to the Jay
Court to determine just how far the influence of the common law would extend to the federal
judiciary given the presence of a written Constitution. The common law was restrained by the
written word of the Constitution, and the Jay Court used an originalist jurisprudence informed by
the common law to decide cases such as Chisholm v. Georgia.
In Chisholm v. Georgia, the issue was whether a state could be sued by a citizen of a
different state.24 In his opinion, Chief Justice John Jay traced the history of the Constitution and
realized the people acted as the sovereigns in forming the Constitution and not the state.25 The
people had first compacted to form their state, and then they had compacted to form the
country.26 Jay next determined that citizens of one state could sue another state under Article III
Section II of the Constitution.27 Though states believed only the state could sue citizens of
another state, Jay argued this ability is reciprocal because the words of the Constitution are
unambiguous.28 Jay’s use of the plain meaning of the text to reach his verdict demonstrated the
dominant originalist jurisprudence of the era.

22

Meyler, “Towards a Common,” 567.

23

Ibid.

24

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 469 (1793).

25

Id. at 471.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 476.

28

Id.
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After widespread public discontent with the ruling, the 11th Amendment was passed in
1794 forbidding citizens from suing states. Matthew Van Hook has noted that the Chisholm
decision was important for future Supreme Court rulings because the citizenry accepted the
decision and used the proper method, ratification of the Constitution, to remedy what they
believed to be the incorrect outcome.29 Though Jay believed that the passage of the Amendment
was a mistake, he applauded the citizenry for accepting the decision and using the proper
channels to remedy a societally unsatisfactory but legally correct judicial decision.30
The Marshall Court
John Marshall was the fourth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and served from 1801
to 1835. As Chief Justice, Marshall was an effective leader. Charles Hobson has argued that the
Supreme Court was never more unified than it was under Marshall from 1812 to 1824.31
Marshall presided over several important constitutional decisions including Marbury v. Madison
and McCulloch v. Maryland. During his term, his Court established foundational judicial powers
such as judicial review. Marshall was, like nearly all judges of his day, an adherent to fair
construction which utilized a common law framework to analyze the written Constitution. This
originalist jurisprudence held that a judge’s subjective ideals and morals could be kept in check
by using the time-tested principles and methods of interpretation of common law jurists.32 He
believed he could use the text of the Constitution as the basis for his decision-making process

29

Matthew Van Hook, "Founding the Third Branch: Judicial Greatness and John Jay's Reluctance," Journal
of Supreme Court History 40, no. 1 (2015): 13.
30

Ibid.

31

Hobson, The Great Chief Justice, 10.

32

Ibid., 75.
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and adhere to an objective legal standard of the Constitution.33 For Marshall, “Courts possessed
no ‘will’ independent of the laws. Their duty was merely to declare what the law is, not what it
should be.”34 This duty included not projecting one’s own belief structure onto the laws being
interpreted. When determining the intention of a legislative act, “He understood ‘intention of the
Framers’ to mean that intention as expressed in the words of the Constitution, not the private
intentions individual framers may have expressed in speeches, debates, essays, and letters at the
time the Constitution was under consideration.”35 Thus, Marshall utilized an interpretive strategy
that would be considered originalist today. This originalist jurisprudence is displayed in his
Marbury v. Madison opinion.
In the waning days of his administration, President John Adams issued several judicial
appointments including a justice of the peace nomination for William Marbury Jr. However, not
all of the nominations were delivered before Thomas Jefferson took office, and, when he
discovered the undelivered nominations, he instructed Secretary of State James Madison to not
deliver the remaining nominations.36 Marbury and the others who had not received their
nominations brought suit to get a writ of mandamus under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, and the Supreme Court heard the case in February 1803.37
In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court dealt with three legal questions: did Marbury
have a right to the commission, was there an available legal remedy, and was the Supreme Court

33

Hobson, The Great Chief Justice, 81.

34

Ibid., 151.

35

Ibid., 75.

36

Richard Brookhiser, John Marshall: The Man Who Made the Supreme Court (New York: Basic Books,

2018), 87.
37

Ibid., 88.
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able to give him this remedy.38 Marshall concluded Marbury’s appointment began at the signing
of the commission by the President and the affixing of the seal by the Secretary of State, and
Marbury had a right to the commission.39 Further, the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided Marbury a
legal remedy to require Madison to deliver his appointment by giving the Supreme Court the
ability to issue writs of mandamus.40 However, Marshall determined that the Constitution did not
permit this power, and, therefore, the clause in Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was
“repugnant to the constitution.”41 Because a congressional law conflicted with the Constitution,
Marshall realized there were only two options. He wrote:
The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or
it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the
legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a
legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written
constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own
nature illimitable.42
Marshall concluded that the constitution is paramount, and legislative acts which conflict with
the Constitution can be declared unconstitutional and nullified by the Supreme Court. He wrote:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply
to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law;
the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the
very essence of judicial duty.43
38

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 154 (1803).

39

Id. at 162.

40

Id. at 168.

41

Id. at 176.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 177.
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In effect, Marshall ruled that, though the Supreme Court had been granted the ability to issue
writs of mandamus by Congress, it had not been given this ability by the Constitution, and,
consequently, that section of the judiciary act was void. Thus, Marbury was unable to receive a
writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court.
The decision established the principle of judicial review in which the Supreme Court
could rule acts of Congress unconstitutional. Curiously, judicial review was already an accepted
practice at the time of the ruling, and Marshall’s primary goal was to set the Supreme Court
precedent in a case that the public would accept.44 Marbury was an effective case to pick because
it declared an act of Congress void which expanded the power of the Court. Consequently,
Marshall was able to secure the constitutional power of judicial review for the Supreme Court in
a ruling that was perceived by the public to limit the Supreme Court’s power.
The Taney Court
Roger Taney succeeded Marshall as Chief Justice and served from 1836 until 1864. The
Taney Court’s jurisprudence was in many respects similar to the Marshall Court, but it
demonstrated the dangers of an originalist jurisprudence that the Marshall Court had largely
avoided. Specifically, Dred Scott v. Sandford shone a light on these dangers. Dred Scott was a
slave from the slave state of Missouri who traveled with his master John Emerson to the free
state of Illinois and the free territory of Minnesota before returning with Emerson to Missouri.45
Emerson was an army doctor and had Scott join him in the free states.46 Scott spent a total of six

44

Hobson, The Great Chief Justice, 58.

45
Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), 18.
46

Greenberg, Dred Scott, 17.
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years from 1834 to 1840 in the free state of Illinois and the free territory of Minnesota.47
Eventually Emerson died and John Sanford became the executor of his will.48 Scott sued for his
freedom, and the case eventually reached the Supreme Court. All nine justices wrote opinions
but the two most important are Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion and Justice Curtis’s
dissenting opinion.
In his opinion, Chief Justice Taney argued that Dred Scott was not entitled to his freedom
because the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over Scott under Article III of the
Constitution. His analysis hinged on the notion that the phrases “people of the United States” and
“citizens” were synonymous in the Constitution.49 Regarding the question of the Scotts’
citizenship, he argued, “they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the
word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges
which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.”50 Taney utilized
an originalist approach to discern the meaning of the words citizen and people of the United
States at the time they were written. Thus, he was unable to find for Dred Scott and his wife.
Though Chief Justice Taney’s opinion demonstrated how a justice could use originalism
to reach a morally indefensible result, Justice Curtis’s dissent demonstrated the opposite. In his
dissent, Justice Curtis forcefully argued that, at the time of the Constitution’s adoption, United
States citizens would have been the citizens of the Confederation which included free black

47

Greenberg, Dred Scott, 21.

48

Graber, Dred Scott, 19.

49

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1857).

50

Id.
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men.51 State governments decided citizenship in the Articles of Confederation period, and, in that
period, all native-born inhabitants of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey,
and North Carolina (including those descended from slaves) were considered citizens.52 It was
impossible for the Constitution to have forbidden citizenship to all black men as Taney had
argued. Scott should have been potentially allowed to sue. In this way, the Dred Scott case
demonstrated an originalist jurisprudence facilitated both morally correct and morally incorrect
verdicts that were each legally justifiable.
The Dred Scott ruling’s effects jurisprudentially were widespread and long-lasting. The
case is universally regarded today as one of the worst Supreme Court cases in American history.
Dred Scott was the first Supreme Court case to declare a substantive federal statute
unconstitutional.53 The ruling also further polarized the country contributing to the outbreak of
the Civil War and demonstrated the limitations of the originalist philosophy of the era. As noted
by Michael Collins and Ann Woolhandler, the Dred Scott decision demonstrated the flaws that
had existed in the Taney Court’s reasoning throughout the pre-Civil War period.54 Political goals
had been interfering with the role of the Court under the guise of fair construction.
Worse, the text of the Constitution gave credence to many of the claims of pro-slavery
individuals. Ethan Greenberg argues that the Supreme Court’s ruling was not necessarily wrong
in its methodology as both originalists and living constitutionalists contend today, but in the
motives behind the ruling. He argues, “The pro-slavery justices who made up the Dred Scott
51

Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 572.

52

Id. at 573.

53

Greenberg, Dred Scott, 2.

54

Michael Collins and Ann Woolhandler, "Judicial Federalism Under Marshall and Taney," The Supreme
Court Review 2017, no. 1 (2018): 380.
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majority and the anti-slavery dissenters all employed an essentially ‘originalist’ approach. They
disagreed with each other chiefly because they drew different lessons from the Framers’
ambivalent original legacy concerning slavery.”55 However, he also notes, “In truth, Chief
Justice Taney and the pro-slavery majority in Dred Scott did not go wrong because they
employed a faulty ‘methodology’ or philosophy of constitutional interpretation. Instead, they
deliberately and badly misread the law in order to reach a desired result.”56 He argues that, to
facilitate the ruling he wished to give, Taney neglected fair construction in favor of political
goals.57 Chief Justice Taney wanted to find against Scott, and he used any methods at his
disposal within the originalist framework to do it. Dred Scott represents the dangers a justice can
bring to a case if he lets personal emotions and beliefs cloud his judicial process.
Civil War and Reconstruction Era Supreme Court
One of the most important developments in the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence
was the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. These Amendments
broadened the reach of the national government and, as a result, the Supreme Court. Of these
Amendments, the Fourteenth was the most influential in shaping constitutional jurisprudence due
to its emphasis on the equality of citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.58
55

Greenberg, Dred Scott, 3.

56

Ibid., 4.

57

Ibid., 130.

58

U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.
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Following the passage of this amendment, states would be accountable for not treating citizens
equally under the law. As a result, the Supreme Court could take more aggressive action in
regulating state actions. Thurgood Marshall has even declared, “While the Union survived the
Civil War, the Constitution did not. In its place arose a new, more promising basis for justice and
equality, the 14th Amendment, ensuring protection of the life, liberty, and property of all persons
against deprivations without due process, and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.”59
However, the effects of this “new” Constitution would not be fully realized until the mid- and
late-twentieth Century.
The Post-Reconstruction Court
The Post-Reconstruction Period was a time of great social change and modernization. As
a result, some began to view fair construction originalism as an inadequate interpretive method.
This critique culminated in the development of living constitutionalism. After the settlement of
war issues in the Reconstruction Amendments, fair construction was attacked for its formalism
and a ritualistic devotion to the Constitution ill-suited to deal with the issues of modern life.60
Further, during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, there were increased calls for greater
government involvement in public morality.61 Large segments of the population believed
slavery, lotteries, and alcohol were public evils that should be regulated and even banned.62
Though slavery was the most deplorable and pervasive evil due to its enshrinement in the

59

Belz, Living Constitution or Fundamental Law?, 180.

60

Ibid., 6.

61

John W. Compton, The Evangelical Origins of the Living Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2014),
62

Ibid., 20.
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Constitution, it was eliminated through the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments.
Advocates believed other social evils could also be gotten rid of through legislative means. 63
When legislative actions were mostly fruitless, reformers searched for non-legislative means to
change society and embraced living constitutionalism.
Evangelicalism was a key factor in the push for public morality laws. Between 1776 and
the 1840s, the percentage of Americans who were a part of a church congregation had doubled.64
The Second Great Awakening, which occurred between 1800 and 1830, resulted in significantly
increased church membership and called for cross-denominational cooperation.65 During this
movement, evangelicals rejected the doctrine of innate depravity and believed people could be
perfected on earth.66 The job of Christians and the church generally was to promote perfection in
the present. John Compton summarized this point, noting, “if moral perfection was not only
possible but also a God-ordained duty, it followed that legal prohibition was the only morally
acceptable response to vice; laws that merely regulated common vices like drinking and
gambling, on this view, amounted to little more than official complicity in sin.”67
Another contributing factor to the widespread acceptance of a living constitutional
approach was the case Plessy v. Ferguson. Homer Plessy, a one-eighth African American man,
was denied access to a train car required by law to be used only by white people. The Supreme

63

Compton, The Evangelical Origins, 92.

64

Ibid., 3.

65

Ibid., 29.

66

Ibid., 31.

67

Ibid., 33.
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Court found such laws did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.68 Justice Brown used
originalism to help justify this position. The essence of his argument was that legal equality was
different than social equality, only legal equality was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
and legal equality did not require social equality.69 Having determined this fact, he stated:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two
races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws
permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be
brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other,
and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the
state legislatures in the exercise of their police power.70
By using the phrases “the object of the amendment” and “could not have been intended,” Justice
Brown conveyed to the public the perception that the ruling was not the result of personal views
but the legitimate interpretation of the text’s original meaning.
Justice Harlan’s dissent also utilized an originalist interpretive strategy but reached the
opposite conclusion. He wrote, “Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the
purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to
exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.”71 Justice Harlan
used originalism to show the purpose of the statute was not to treat people equally but to treat
them differently based on race. To reiterate his adherence to the will of the legislative body,
Justice Harlan contended, “the courts best discharge their duty by executing the will of the lawmaking power, constitutionally expressed, leaving the results of legislation to be dealt with by
68

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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the people through their representatives.”72 Because the Court had failed to properly discharge its
duty, Harlan predicted the Plessy ruling would eventually be viewed with the same disdain as the
Dred Scott decision.73 He concluded with the now famous declaration, “Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful.”74 Harlan
understood the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment was equality of all under the law
and applied it to the case. A comparison of Justice Brown’s opinion and Justice Harlan’s dissent
exhibits the fallibility of the fair construction jurisprudence but also its potential for success.
Having witnessed originalism produce morally unjust rulings in Dred Scott and Plessy,
advocates of using the legal process for social change began seeking a more conducive
jurisprudential philosophy. Around 1890, scholars began to examine the origins of the
Constitution, and eventually rejected the creative and divine inspiration views of the Constitution
as well as the revolutionary theories for its origins.75 This development allowed for a very
interesting coalition to develop. Somewhat astonishingly, the evangelicals found an ally in the
secular early twentieth-century progressives. Though unsympathetic to the moral policies of
evangelicals, “even the most secular of twentieth-century progressives agreed with the
nineteenth-century evangelicals on one critical point: the primary aim of the constitutional
enterprise was not to protect established property rights or ancient jurisdictional boundaries, but
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rather to provide for the wellbeing of the present generation of Americans.”76 Through their
alliance, secular scholars and evangelicals accelerated the progression towards a living
constitution jurisprudence.
Beginning of the Living Constitution Era
Probably the most influential individual of the early living constitution era was Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr. Justice Holmes was key in promoting the expansion of the protections of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, especially the Freedom of Speech, by liberally construing the
text of the Constitution. Interestingly, Holmes was not initially a strong advocate for free speech.
Thomas Healy has noted, “It wasn’t that Holmes had a particular dislike of free speech. What
irked him was the notion of individual rights in general, the idea that there are limits on what a
democratic majority can do.”77 However, through the lobbying effort of his more liberal friends
such as Harold Laski and Felix Frankfurter and their social ostracization for political speech,
Holmes became an ardent defender of free speech.78 Throughout his career, Justice Holmes was
influential in promoting the concept of a living constitution.
An important case was the 1905 case Lochner v. New York. In the case, the majority
struck down a New York statute barring a worker from working more ten hours a day or sixty
hours a week.79 They contended that the law set a dangerous precedent it had no limit on state
police powers. Justice Peckham wrote, “Some occupations are more healthy than others, but we
think there are none which might not come under the power of the legislature to supervise and
76
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control the hours of working therein, if the mere fact that the occupation is not absolutely and
perfectly healthy is to confer that right upon the legislative department of the Government.”80
The government could not regulate workers for a reason as ambiguous as public health.
In response, Justice Holmes contended that the Constitution did not protect the economic
theory of capitalism but the rights of the citizens.81 In a now popular aphorism, he wrote,
“General propositions do not decide concrete cases.”82 The aphorism indicates one should go
beyond the dead letter of the Constitution to decide present cases. He also shifted the definition
of liberty. He argued, “I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our
law.”83 Holmes concluded that liberty rested more with the people voting and not with the
workers or employers working. By making this shift, Justice Holmes demonstrated his growing
use of a living constitution to shift words like liberty to address present debates.
The case that most explicitly signaled Justice Holmes’s adherence to a living constitution
jurisprudence was the 1914 case Gompers v. United States. Samuel Gompers was a labor leader
who was given a contempt conviction, but the Supreme Court overturned the verdict because the
contempt charge occurred too late (three years after proceedings began).84 In his opinion,
Holmes argued, “the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their
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essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their
significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a
dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth.”85 His argument asserted
that the provisions of the Constitution should be viewed as living institutions subject to change,
not fixed institutions set in stone.86 The Constitution should not be viewed as static, but capable
of transformation outside the normal legislative means. The statement served as the foundation
of living constitutionalism. Indeed, Holmes seemingly rejected originalism when he contended
that judges should not simply take a dictionary to interpret the words of a legal text.
The New Deal and World War II Court
Though living constitutionalism rose in popularity and legal acceptance throughout the
early 1900s, it was not dominant in Supreme Court jurisprudence when Franklin Roosevelt took
office in 1933. In response to the Great Depression, President Roosevelt wished to institute
sweeping changes to the relationship between the federal government and the people through his
New Deal programs. From 1937 until his death in 1945, Roosevelt successfully nominated nine
men to the Supreme Court who were favorable to key aspects of his New Deal legislation.87
These nominations resulted in an era of the Supreme Court which expanded the role of the
federal government and protection of individual civil rights and liberties.88
The acceptance of New Deal legislation was largely accomplished through judicial
deference in which the Supreme Court acted as subordinate to the Executive and Legislative
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branches and judicial activism in which the Court intervened to directly protect political
processes and minority populations.89 Another factor was the growing sentiment of some justices
that the foundation of the Supreme Court’s federalism and economic due process jurisprudence
had become untenable90 As a result, proponents of living constitutionalism began arguing that
the United States had an unwritten Constitution which could be modified over time without any
formal, written changes being necessary.91
This period was also marked by deference to the military establishment. Joshua
Kastenberg and Eric Merriam have argued that no period of the Supreme Court exhibited greater
deference to the Executive than 1946 to 1953.92 This is likely due to the fact that there was, at
this time, a very real threat to America’s long-term survival in Communism.93 With the
perceived national threat from Communism, the Supreme Court took a more lenient approach to
legislative and executive actions allegedly tied to national security. Eventually, possibly when
President Truman failed to assert national security as a basis for an industry seizure in
Youngstown, a distrust of the executive branch, especially regarding foreign policy, developed.94
The Warren Court
Widely considered the most liberal Supreme Court ever, the Warren Court demonstrated
the dominance of the living constitution jurisprudence throughout the mid to late twentieth
century. From civil rights to personal liberties, expansive readings of the protections of the first
89
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eight amendments and the Fourteenth Amendment became routine. Nominated by President
Dwight Eisenhower, Earl Warren quickly exhibited the living constitution approach to be taken
by the Supreme Court in the coming decades.
The most celebrated case of this era was Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. It ruled
segregating public schools based on race was unconstitutional. Justice Warren, writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court, insisted, “…we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”95 Instead, the
Supreme Court needed to take a more expansive view of the Constitution. He wrote, “We must
consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American
life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.”96 After analyzing the present
situation and determining that separating children based on race generated a feeling of inferiority
in black children that could not be remedied, the Court determined, “Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal.”97 By relying on the present-day situation of the school systems
to determine the validity of the separate but equal policy, the Supreme Court engaged in a living
constitution jurisprudence. The Court was less concerned with the Fourteenth Amendment’s
original meaning than what equal protection meant in the present and the effects of the ruling. In
many ways, the Brown decision was the pinnacle of living constitutionalism. The justices went
beyond the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to produce a morally correct verdict.
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Another important case of the era was Griswold v. Connecticut. In the case, the Supreme
Court ruled that laws forbidding contraceptive use between a married couple were
unconstitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas wrote that “…the First Amendment
has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”98 He then argued that
many of the Amendments (the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth specifically) have
emanations of a right to privacy because these amendments create “zones of privacy.”99 These
zones indicated the Constitution created a general right to privacy, and this right protected
contraceptive use between spouses (though not the manufacture or sale of contraceptives).100
The consequences of the ruling for living constitutionalism were substantial. The Court
determined that a right existed which was not expressly written in the Constitution. The ruling
permitted virtually any right to be discovered if vaguely connected to an enumerated right or to
the newly discovered right of privacy. In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg made the living
constitution influences in the decision more explicit when he wrote, “Although the Constitution
does not speak in so many words of the right of privacy in marriage, I cannot believe that it
offers these fundamental rights no protection.”101 This logic is consistent with that of the Brown
case. A judge needed to examine the effects of a policy and determine whether the effects
aligned with the perceived goal of the Fourteenth Amendment in light of modern circumstances.
In his dissent, Justice Black effectively summarized the flaws of the majority opinion. He
reasoned, “The Court talks about a constitutional ‘right of privacy’ as though there is some
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constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge
the ‘privacy’ of individuals. But there is not.”102 Concerning the assertion that the Ninth
Amendment permitted a freedom of privacy not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, he
retorted, “That Amendment was passed, not to broaden the powers of this Court or any other
department of ‘the General Government,’ but as every student of history knows, to assure the
people that the Constitution in all its provisions was intended to limit the Federal Government to
the powers granted expressly or by necessary implication.”103 Justice Black used the historical
context of the Ninth Amendment to determine its original meaning indicating a segment of the
Supreme Court was still unwilling or unable to fully adopt the living constitution framework that
had become dominant. The Griswold decision became the foundation of the most contentious
modern Supreme Court ruling and was important in driving many individuals back to a
jurisprudence of originalism. However, widespread embrace of originalism would not occur until
polarizing case of Roe v. Wade in the 1970s.
Post-Warren Court
Following the End of the Warren Court in 1969, the jurisprudence of living
constitutionalism continued to enjoy supremacy in legal thought and Supreme Court
jurisprudence. However, the issue of abortion shattered this supremacy.
Roe v. Wade
Few cases have been as lastingly contentious as Roe v. Wade. In the decision, the
Supreme Court ruled that state laws regulating abortion were unconstitutional until the baby

102

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 508.

103

Id. at 520.

FAIR CONSTRUCTION TO LIVING CONSTITUTION

29

reached viability.104 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun argued that the right of privacy
was a factor in the case, but it was not sufficient. He wrote. “…the right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered
against important state interests in regulation.”105 He concluded that the state could regulate
abortion when the baby becomes viable because at this point the baby has the capability of
having a meaningful life outside of the womb.106 The majority once again embraced the theory of
living constitutionalism. It allowed for the existence of a right of privacy not expressed in the
Constitution and from this right derived the right to abortion by concluding that abortion was a
private act until the baby was viable.
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that Roe was not an appropriate plaintiff because
she was not in her first trimester when she brought suit and the Supreme Court had ruled on the
constitutionality of first trimester abortion laws.107 Further, even if the right to privacy existed, it
was not a factor in the case. He wrote:
I have difficulty in concluding, as the Court does, that the right of ‘privacy’ is involved in
this case. Texas, by the statute here challenged, bars the performance of a medical
abortion by a licensed physician on a plaintiff such as Roe. A transaction resulting in an
operation such as this is not ‘private’ in the ordinary usage of that word. Nor is the
‘privacy’ that the Court finds here even a distant relative of the freedom from searches
and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which the Court has
referred to as embodying a right to privacy.108
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Justice Rehnquist concluded by stating that, though society was shifting in a pro-abortion
direction, abortion was not as societally accepted as the majority contended.109
The public was both outraged and overjoyed with the ruling. Conservatives condemned
the ruling as a travesty of justice which trampled over the life of the unborn. Conversely,
progressives championed the ruling as correctly acknowledging the bodily autonomy of the
mother. The ruling resulted in a dramatic shift in public perception of the Supreme Court.
Evangelicals realized the living constitution approach they had helped to foster in the late 19th
and early 20th Century had been used against them to justify an action to which they were
morally opposed. As they had done when the Court ruled immorally regarding lotteries and
alcohol, evangelicals began searching for a jurisprudential philosophy that better aligned with
their moral framework. They eventually found that philosophy in originalism.
Rejuvenation of Originalism
After Roe, large segments of the population believed the Supreme Court was engaging in
illegitimate judicial activism. Though they supported judicial activism to create morality laws
regulating lotteries and alcohol, the use of judicial activism to destroy morality laws was
unacceptable.110 Culminating in the Roe decision, large segments of the Christian population
became disenchanted with the idea of a living constitution.111 In response, they began to return to
originalism as a viable method of constitutional interpretation.
Though Roe was the catalyst for the rejuvenation of originalism, it had been developing
under the surface for decades. James Bradley Thayer, a Harvard Law professor, called for a
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return to judicial restraint as early as 1893.112 During the 1940s and 1950s conservative jurists
were divided between moderates afraid of alienating centrists and activists wishing to promote
essential principles.113 By the 1960s and 1970s, the idea of original intent had become influential
as a critique of the Warren Court.114 Robert Bork had vocally supported originalism, and his
nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987, though he was not confirmed, was important because
he openly challenged the living constitution consensus in a large public forum.115 His book The
Tempting of America, which documented his judicial philosophy and confirmation hearing, was
also influential in gaining adherents.116
A major factor in originalism’s appeal was its perceived objectivity. Robert Bork
asserted, “When lawmakers use words, the law that results is what those words ordinarily
mean.”117 This perception of objectivity was comforting to large swaths of the public. Further, by
adopting originalism, one was able to promote a constitutional stability that had been in flux
during the Warren Court.118 The Constitution once again had a fixed meaning that could not be
openly rejected by the judicial system in favor of social improvement.
Another important factor in the shift to originalism was the political sacrifices of its
proponents. In the early 1970s, pro-life advocates, many of them evangelicals, attempted to build
on living constitutionalism to establish a fundamental right to life rooted in the Fourteenth
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Amendment.119 After Roe, these advocates attempted to pass a constitutional amendment
prohibiting abortion, but the amendment was too vague and difficult to implement.120 Bork’s
nomination hearing caused pro-life advocates to become more favorable towards originalism
because they realized it was the best path forward. In order to accept this position, though, they
were forced to give up their most desired wish: to make abortion illegal nationwide through the
courts. As Mary Ziegler has noted, “The stated position of Bork and other originalists was not
that the Constitution protected a right to life but rather that the Constitution did not protect a
right to abortion.”121 Though originalist rulings would not make abortion illegal, it would ensure
abortion was not a protected right. Pro-life advocates accepted this framework and adopted an
originalist jurisprudence. In doing so, they formed a solid base of support for originalism to find
judicial success on the road to legislative success. The rapid rise of originalism in the post-Roe
era was due to a variety of factors including the perceived overreach of the Supreme Court
regarding morality laws.
Antonin Scalia
The rejuvenation of originalism reached its fulfillment with the confirmation of Justice
Antonin Scalia to the Supreme Court in 1986. Justice Scalia utilized a strict textualist
jurisprudence.122 Scalia wrote, “What I look for in that Constitution is precisely what I look for
in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”123
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However, if a text is ambiguous, he believed adherence to the traditions of the past was vital to
preserve the values of the past and prevent backsliding in society.124 Further, he was confident
that the meaning of the Constitution did not change. He argued, “It certainly cannot be said that a
constitution naturally suggests changeability; to the contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent
change – to embed certain rights in such a manner that future generations cannot readily take
them away.”125 Never one to back down from a debate, Scalia employed his sharp wit and
incisive legal reasoning to demolish fellow justice’s opinions he believed were based on faulty
living constitutionalism. This ability is especially evident in his opinions of social issues cases.
In the 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the ruling
in Roe. The plurality opinion, penned by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, demonstrated
the continued strength of living constitutionalism with declarations such as, “At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”126 This statement represented the
base assertion of the living constitution framework. Not only could the Supreme Court shift the
definition of liberty to match the times, but each individual could define liberty for himself or
herself. It was against this framework Justice Scalia responded.
In his dissent, Scalia asserted that the issue was “…not whether the power of a woman to
abort her unborn child is a "liberty" in the absolute sense; or even whether it is a liberty of great
importance to many women. Of course it is both. The issue is whether it is a liberty protected by
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the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not.”127 People have a general ability or
liberty to do whatever they want. This does not mean they have a constitutional right to that
action. To reach this answer he employed the standard he always did in culturally significant
constitutional issues. He wrote, “I reach it for the same reason I reach the conclusion that bigamy
is not constitutionally protected – because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says
absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have
permitted it to be legally proscribed.”128 The text of the Constitution did not grant a woman the
right to an abortion, and American history had been consistently opposed to the practice until
recently. Scalia appealed to the words of Justice Curtis in the Dred Scott decision and warned
that abandoning a strict interpretation of the Constitution would only lead to a government of
men and not of laws.129 By not utilizing a textualist strategy, the Court was making the situation
more confusing, not more legitimate. Scalia concluded with a warning, stating, “We should get
out of this area, where we have no right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the country
any good by remaining.”130 Justice Scalia used his textualist jurisprudence able to identify the
flaws of the reasoning of the majority and explain why the Supreme Court should not be
involved in the abortion debate.
Another example of his textualist approach was the 2003 case Lawrence v. Texas. In this
case, the Court ruled that laws prohibiting homosexual behavior were unconstitutional. In his
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dissent, Justice Scalia began with a blistering rebuke of the majority opinion given its previous
ruling in Planned Parenthood v Casey. He maintained:
Today's approach to stare decisis invites us to overrule an erroneously decided precedent
(including an "intensely divisive" decision) if: (1) its foundations have been "eroded" by
subsequent decisions… (2) it has been subject to "substantial and continuing" criticism...
and (3) it has not induced "individual or societal reliance" that counsels against
overturning... The problem is that Roe itself--which today's majority surely has no
disposition to overrule--satisfies these conditions to at least the same degree as Bowers.131
Before venturing into the facts of Planned Parenthood, Scalia undermined the majority’s
reasoning by highlighting its inconsistency with previous cases. The Supreme Court had
previously been unwilling to overrule Roe by the standard it was now using to justify overturning
Bowers v. Hardwick. The implied reason for this discrepancy was that the Court liked the result
of the ruling in Roe but did not like the result in Bowers which ruled sodomy laws constitutional.
The majority used stare decisis as a pretense to rule in accordance with personal political desires.
Having dismantled the Court’s stare decisis reasoning, Scalia turned to its use of the
Fourteenth Amendment. He argued, “The Fourteenth Amendment expressly allows States to
deprive their citizens of ‘liberty,’ so long as ‘due process of law’ is provided.”132 As long as the
action is not deeply rooted in the history of the nation, it may be restricted by a law that is
legitimately related to a state interest.133 Even though there were not homosexual laws deep in
American history, it was undeniable that general sodomy laws had been on the books since the
Founding. Regarding the majority’s contention that other countries had loosened sodomy laws,
Justice Scalia retorted, “Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because some
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States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior.”134 The Supreme
Court should care only about the Constitution and the statutes of the United States.
Scalia concluded his dissent by arguing that public morality was a rational basis for the
challenged law. He asserted that there are many different types of moral conduct, such as
bigamy, fornication, adultery, and obscenity, which are still enforced but would be undermined
by the ruling in Lawrence. He wrote, “If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian
sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned laws can
survive rational basis review.”135 He continued by accusing the majority of taking a side in the
culture wars by arguing that the criminalization of homosexuality was “an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”136 In doing
so, they had allowed their politics to enter their decision-making process. A strict interpretation
of the text of the Constitution would have allowed the majority to realize they had incorrectly
decided the case. In his opinion, Scalia demonstrated his adherence to a textualist originalism in
order to determine that the law was not unconstitutional.
Throughout his tenure, Justice Scalia demonstrated an adherence to the text of the
Constitution that became the backbone of the modern Originalism movement in the United
States. Though he did not always rule in perfect alignment with his textualist sensibilities, he
demonstrated the constructive rulings that could occur using an Originalist jurisprudence. Since
Justice Scalia’s ascendancy to the Supreme Court, several Justices have been confirmed who
adhere to a strong Originalist framework. Notable Justices have been Justice Clarence Thomas,
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Justice Samuel Alito, and Justice Neil Gorsuch. In the current court, there is significant division
between the liberal and conservative wings of the aisle with Conservatives adhering to an
originalist jurisprudence and Liberals using a living constitution jurisprudence.
This division was exemplified in the 2015 case Obergefell v. Hodges. In the case, the
Supreme Court ruled in 5-4 majority that same-sex marriage was a constitutional right. Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated, “The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of
its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all
persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”137 Same-sex marriage had been recently
discovered to be a part of liberty. Regarding the contention that Lawrence had already protected
homosexual activity, Kennedy contended, “it does not follow that freedom stops there. Outlaw to
outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.”138 Thus, it was
essential for the court to recognize the institution of marriage for same-sex couples. The majority
opinion clearly revealed the continued success of living constitutionalism. The foundation of the
argument was that the writers of the Constitution and Fourteenth Amendment intended for the
definition of liberty to change over time to encompass the modern morals of America (or at least
the morals of a majority of the Justices).
Each dissenting Justice wrote his own opinion strongly denouncing the majority’s use of
living constitutionalism. Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “Those who founded our country would
not recognize the majority’s conception of the judicial role. They after all risked their lives and
fortunes for the precious right to govern themselves. They would never have imagined yielding
137

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015).

138

Id. at 667.

FAIR CONSTRUCTION TO LIVING CONSTITUTION

38

that right on a question of social policy to unaccountable and unelected judges.”139 Justice Scalia,
in his own dissent, remarked, “When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, every
State limited marriage to one man and one woman, and no one doubted the constitutionality of
doing so. That resolves these cases.”140 Justice Thomas observed, “By straying from the text of
the Constitution, substantive due process exalts judges at the expense of the People from whom
they derive their authority.”141 Finally, Justice Alito echoed his fellow Justices’ concerns,
writing, “If a bare majority of Justices can invent a new right and impose that right on the rest of
the country, the only real limit on what future majorities will be able to do is their own sense of
what those with political power and cultural influence are willing to tolerate.”142 The dissenting
Justices refused to accede the idea that word liberty in the Constitution and Fourteenth
Amendment could encompass actions not accepted as liberty by anyone of the time period the
statute was written. Thus, the general divide in the public was represented on the Supreme Court
Roughly half were committed to a living constitutionalism while the other half was committed to
originalism. However, such narrow margins mean neither side is dominant. It remains to be seen
which side will prevail.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence provides an interesting
framework to understand the modern-day tension between living constitutionalists and
originalists. Originalists argue that the original purpose, meaning, or intent of the Constitution
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must be strictly adhered to in order to derive judicial results that are just. In contrast, living
constitutionalists argue a broader approach is necessary when interpreting the Constitution to
allow the Constitution to adapt to societal changes.
In the foundational years of the American Supreme Court, a fair construction originalist
jurisprudence was used to determine outcomes. The Jay, Marshall, and Taney Courts all used
this strategy and demonstrated its associated advantages and disadvantages. The cases of
Chisholm v. Georgia, Marbury v. Madison, and Justice Curtis’s dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford
demonstrated that morally, legally, and jurisprudentially correct verdicts could be derived using
an originalist jurisprudence. However, the majority opinions of Dred Scott v. Sandford and
Plessy v. Ferguson demonstrated how this jurisprudence could be abused to allow politically
beneficial rulings to be reached undermining the legitimacy of the method.
The failure of fair construction to facilitate social change allowed living constitutionalism
to develop. An alliance between late nineteenth century evangelicals who wished to impose
moral reforms but had been unable to do so legislatively and twentieth century progressives who
wished to promote societal wellbeing in the present generation produced this development. As a
result, expansions in the meanings of free speech, due process, and equality occurred. Justice
Holmes was key in advocating for a living constitution in his Lochner v. New York and Gompers
v. United States opinions. These advances culminated in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
when the previous separate but equal standard was abandoned. However, the alliance slowly
eroded through social cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut which offended the moral beliefs of
evangelicals. This erosion culminated in the dissolution of the alliance following Roe v. Wade.
Having realized the judicial activism of living constitutionalism could be used against them,
evangelicals searched for a new jurisprudential framework.
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Eventually, evangelicals found this framework in the modern originalist movement. This
movement emphasized a stable Constitution and allowed them to join originalists such a Robert
Bork in advocating judicial restraint. However, they were forced to give up their goal of
nationally prohibiting abortion through the Supreme Court in favor of joining a successful
political movement that would at least make abortion regulation in states legal. A key figure of
the originalist movement was Justice Scalia who argued forcefully in favor of textualism in the
social cases of Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Lawrence v. Texas. As a result of this
movement, the modern Supreme Court is sharply divided between originalists and living
constitutionalists, and it remains to be seen which will achieve dominance.
After analyzing the history of American jurisprudence, it appears that one of the most
essential factors in determining the dominant jurisprudential philosophy is evangelicals. During
the early years of the United States, evangelicals were a smaller portion of the population and
had little jurisprudential influence. However, after the Second Great Awakening, evangelicals
began to assert their dominance in politics and embraced living constitutionalism. Over time,
largely due to the cultural sway of these evangelicals, living constitutionalism became dominant
in America. Later, when the living constitutions jurisprudence moved away from their policy
goals in the 1960s and 1970s, they embraced originalism. In about a decade, originalism rose in
prominence and became a viable interpretive method on the national stage. This was in large part
due to the strong evangelical cultural support for the judges promoting originalist jurisprudence.
Therefore, the future of American jurisprudence may lie with evangelicals and whether they
continue to embrace originalism as their preferred jurisprudence.
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